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AMERICAN EMBASSY, TOKYO TEL. 583-7141 EXT. 7919

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

REMARKS BY U.S. AMBASSADOR MIKE MANSFIELD
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS' CLUB OF JAPAN
TOKYO, MAY 22, 1980

It has been my good fortune to serve in Japan almost
three years.

That does not make me an old-timer by the

standards of this group, but at least I am no longer the new
boy on the block.

Much has happened during that period--in

Japan (although not every week has been as dramatic as the one
just past),

in the relations between Japan and the United

States, and in the world environment surrounding us both.
That old adage, "nothing is as constant as change" applies as
much to U.S.-Japan relations as it does to life.

But even

measured against the rapid pace of change to which any observer of Japan is accustomed, these last few years have been
extraordinary.
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I wou ld l ike to talk about some of those changes and
what I think they mean .

I don ' t propose to give you my

analysis of the domestic political situation today , except
to say that what we have seen il l ustrates one of the basic
characteristics of democracy-- it is unpredictable , and a
little untidy .

It makes life difficult for pundits, and some-

times for politicians .

These remarks were prepared for the

most part before last Friday ' s events , and I have felt no need
to change them .

Whatever has transpired, I believe there is

a broad consensus in this country which underlies Japan ' s
foreign policy in general and its ties with the United States
in particular, and that it remains fully intact .

I also do not intend today to try to predict the
future--I prefer to leave that to members of the Fourth Estate.
But I think it is possible to identify some trends, and perhaps
to project them some distance into the 80s in a general way .

I believe that to some extent perceptions in the United
States and here as well have lagged behind the realities .
While there may be a general awareness that changes have taken
place in our relations, their meaning has not been fully
appreciated.

The perception gap is narrowing, however, and
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I would like to try to contribute to that process today .
I believe the United States and Japan are approaching a new
stage in their relationship.

Let me explain what I mean.

A brief look back is instructive.

When Prime Minister

Fukuda traveled to Washington in May of 1977 for his first
meeting with President Carter, the major issues included
Japanese concern over the prospect of a U.S . military withdrawal
from Korea; our nuclear non-proliferation policy and how it
might affect Japan's nuclear energy program; and color television and steel imports.

In 1978 we moved from color TVs to

other sectorial and macroeconomic issues of even greater scope
and severity.

Japan's massive current account surplus; the

huge imbalance in our bilateral trade; questions of growth
rates and of access to the Japanese market--all of these monopolized the attention of policy makers on both sides of the
ocean and were the subject of as intensive a process of
bilateral economic negotiations as any the United States has
undertaken.

That complex of economic issues dominated our

discourse throughout 1978 and into last year.

It received

massive press coverage, and seemed at times to pose a serious
threat to our overall ties.
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The fact that none of these issues was at the top of
the agenda in Prime Minister Ohira's recent meeting with the
President was not solely a function of our attention having
been turned toward Iran or Afghanistan.

It also reflected the

rather remarkable success we have had over the past three years
in dealing with our bilateral problems.

We have improved

significantly during that period the mechanisms available to
us for monitoring and managing our economic ties.

We have

established new instruments of consultation, ranging from a
Trade Facilitation Committee to a Wise Men's Group.

We have

increased both the candor and the frequency of our informal
consultations--the day-to-day contacts at all levels of our
two governments which are so essential to cooperative relations.
Our aim in all of this has been to identify problems at an
early stage, and to solve them before they become unmanageable.
We have emerged successfully from a difficult and sometimes
disputatious period.

We have been successful because we have

dealt with the problems in a mutual way, our institutions have
been joint institutions, and our approaches have been common
approaches.

I think the experience has bred a heightened

sensitivity on both sides to the needtopay the closest attention
to our economic ties--and it has also given us greater confidence
in our ability to control events and influence the directions
in which our economic relations move.
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I am not suggesting that we are out of the woods.
There will always be problems in an economic relationship as
large as ours, affecting as it does the well-being of so many
people in both our countries.

And at any given time one or

more of those problems is likely to loom large.

But, I have

said this before and am convinced it is true--the real test
of a relationship is not the presence or absence of problems,
but the capacity of the partners in that relationship to deal _
with those problems.

We have passed that test with flying

colors,and we will do equally well in the years ahead.

While our attention was fastened on economic problems
during most of the past three years, some important progress
was being made, quietly and without fanfare, in other areas.
Developments in our security relationship have been especially
noteworthy in recent years.

The change has been even more

pronounced if one looks back a bit further--it was twenty
years ago this week that the Lower House ratified the Mutual
Security Treaty, to the accompaniment of street demonstrations.

In the past few months we have witnessed a lively
public discussion in this country of the international
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security environment and the proper Japanese response to it.
To what extent does the Soviet force buildup in this region,
or heightened tensions in the Middle East impinge directly
on Japan's safety and well-bein g , and what should this mean
f or Japanese security policy?

What are the implications

of these developments for the U.S.-Japan security relationshi p?
For Japanese defense spending?

In my opinion this is a healthy ,

andnec e ssarypublic debate--and the fact that such questions
can now be addressed objectively and without great public
rancor or political turmoil

is itself a

measure of the

change which has occurred.

Quite understandably, considerable attention is paid in
all of this to the United States, and what it is we are said
to want Japan to do.

Our position is sometimes misunderstood.

We have let it be known for years, publicly and privately,
that in our view some improvement in Japan's forces was necessary.

This continues to be our position.

We welcome the

measures Japan has already taken to strengthen its self-defense
capability, including decisions to purchase the F-15, P-3C and
E-2C, as well as other modern we apons systems.

We are also

-
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gratified by Japan's increasing contribution to the costs of
maintaining our forces in this country.

And we are encouraged

by the progress achieved by our uniformed services in developing
more detailed contingency plans, in accordance with the planning
guidelines adopted by our two governments in 1978.

All of these developments enhance the credibility of
Japan's self-defense capability, and in so doing add strength
to the U.S.-Japan security relationship and the contribution
it makes to the peace and stability of East Asia.

We have

expressed our hope that steady and significant progress
can be maintained in all these areas, recognizing that this
would entail commensurate increases in Japanese defense
spending.

But we do not and will not presume to tell Japan

how to spend the money it budgets for defense.

We maintain

a continuing dialogue on all of these issues, as is proper and
necessary in an alliance.

However, we recognize and respect

the fact that the pace, the extent and the direction of any
increase in Japan's defense efforts remain, as they have always
been, sovereign decisions for Japan to make.

There has been another important development in recent
years in this country--perhaps less a new development than the

-
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acceleration of a trend visible for a long time: the increasing
scope and activism of Japanese diplomacy.

Most of you would

agree that Japan's political influence in the world, and its
diplomatic reach, have not expanded as rapidly as has its
economic power and worldwide network of economic interests.
That anomaly has been significantly reduced in the last few
years, however, as Japan has taken on major political responsibilities in a number of areas.

In Southeast Asia, Japan's

relations with the ASEAN countries can no longer be defined
solely in economic terms; Japan's political and diplomatic
support for those nations, no less than its large and indispensable contribution to the Indochina refugee relief effort,
has added new depth to its role in that region.

Japan has

been in the forefront of international efforts to deal with
the crises of Iran and Afghanistan, which I will discuss more
fully a bit later on.

I believe there is also a growing

political dimension to Japan's ties with the nations of
Western Europe.

Japan's leading role in the economic summit

process has been one factor encouraging this development;
another it seems to me has been the close coordination we have
seen recently between Japan and Europe brought about by the
perceived need to develop a common response to the situations
in Iran and Afghanistan.

I find this a fascinating phenomenon,
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and while its full impact may not be felt for a number of
years, its meaning is clear--Japan is going to play an
increasingly important and varied role in the world.

This has important implications for all nations.

For

the United States it means that our ties with Japan, already
the most important bilateral relationship we have, will take
on even greater significance.

It will become even more

essential that we consult closely with each other and try to
coordinate our policies as much as we can.

I am convinced

that the general orientation of our foreign policies will
remain parallel, resting as they do on a foundation of similar
values, interests and objectives.

Thus there is no reason to

expect any diminution in Japanese and American cooperation
vis-a-vis major international issues, be they political,
economic, scientific or security-related.

On the contrary,

I believe our cooperation will increase, producing major
benefits not only for Japanandthe United States, but for
the world.

Iran and Afghanistan have of course been major foreign
policy preoccupations in recent months for the United States,
and I belie ve for Japan, and both illustrate the importance
and the effectiveness of cooperation between our two nations.

-
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As President Carter made clear to Prime Minister Ohira three.
weeks ago, the United States deeply appreciates the efforts
Japan has made in respect to both these crises.

On Iran,

Japan has spoken out vigorously in behalf of legal and
humanit a rian principle, denouncing the hostage seizure and
calling for the immediate release of those innocent people.
It has joined with our European friends and others around
the world in imposing, this week, economic sanctions a g ainst
Iran which we hope will speed the return of rationality to
that country and lead to freedom for our fellow Americans
in the not too distant future.
risk free.

Japan's actions have not been

We are grateful for what it has done.

In respect to Afghanistan as well, Japan has worked
closely with the United States and our other allies to impose
penalties upon the Soviet Union for its invasion of that
country and to insure the Soviets understand that neither
this nor future such actions can be taken with impunity and
without grave risk.

Japan has spoken out, and it has acted.

Japan is a participant in a framework of economic sanctions
which we hope will have an important cumulative effect.

The

Japanese Government has also called upon this country to join
in a more visible, and very meaningfull symbolic sanction--the
Olympic boycott.
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The challenges posed by events in Iran and Afghanistan,
like some of the economic and other problems we have had to
grapple with in the recent past, have imposed some strains
on our relations.

Difficult decisions have been required,

hard choices have had to be made.

Satisfactory conclusions

to both of these situations seem some distance away, which
is discouraging.

But what is not discouraging--indeed, it

is most heartening--is the degree of unity and coordinated
action we have seen on the part of Japan, the United States
and our other friends and allies in the face of these
challenges.

We have occasionally differed on tactics, on

emphasis, on timing--we are not a monolith.

But we have remained

united, and we are determined to stay the course.

We have

often remarked, in speeches such as this one, on the growing
multilateral dimension of U.S.-Japan relations.

I believe

that concept has been given new and more concrete meaning as
a result of Iran and Afghanistan, and that there is now a

- 12 -

stronger commitment, on both sides of the Pacific, to mutual
goals and to joint action in achieving them.

This brings me to a final thought, concerning Japan's
international role and the nature of the U.S.-Japan relationship as I see it at this stage in its history .

We have

spoken for years of the steady progress of our two nations
toward a more equal partnership, as Japan has assumed international responsibilities commensurate with its economic power.
But I have the sense that only very recently has this concept
begun to be accepted by the Japanese people.

The crises in

Iran and Afghanistan in particular have contributed to this
phenomenon.

Clearly the Iran situation has been one in which

the United States has needed the support of its friends, in
Japan, in Europe and elsewhere.

Events in both Iran and

Afghanistan threaten the interests of the international community as a whole, and have required a united response by peaceloving nations .

Japan has responded to these needs, demonstrating

in the process--for its own people, for Americans and for the
world--that Japan is a factor to be reckoned with on the
international scene , and that our partnership is a two-way
street in more than just matters of trade.

I detect pride

in that fact among the Japanese people , and heightened solidarity
with the United States.

-
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Along with more widespread acceptance of the notion
tfiat Japan is an equal partner of the United States, so there
seems to be a greater readiness these days to define that
partnership in ways the Japanese have tended to avoid up to
now.

As all of you will have noted, "alliance", a word seldom

used in the past to describe Japan's relations with the United

--

States, has been employed prominently in recent weeks.

Perhaps

it is not proper for me to try to say what this means--indeed
I am not sure that I know.
reality.

But to me, the word fits the

We are allies in every sense, committed not only to

friendship and cooperation in good times, but to mutual
assistance in time of need, and I am glad that more and
people in this country feel comfortable in saying so.

I think there is an inexact, but relevant, economic
parallel.

Just as the Japanese are increasingly prepared to

involve themselves politically in the world and to accept
responsibilities of involvement and leadership, so it seems
to me there has also been an important change in the way they
look at their economic prospects.

We Americans have often

felt the Japanese have tended to exaggerate their weaknesses
and

vu~nerabilities

and to minimize their strengths--and not

simply as a negotiating tactic.

Admittedly, our own views

have sometimes been canted in the other direction--Japan is
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not as awesome an economic machine as its foreign competitors
sometimes fear,
respects.

and it undoubtedly is vulnerable in some

But certainly the view of Japan, inculcated into

generations of schoolchildren, as an isolated and in some ways
beleagured island dependent for economic survival only upon the
wits and determination of its traders is no longer entirely
realistic .

I believe it is being superseded by the more valid

realization that Japan, as a full-fledged member of the Western
industrialized community, partakes fully of the strengths as
well as the weaknesses of that system.

Its vulnerabilities

are no greater than those of the other members, and its
strengths certainly no less .

Thus, there is a growing sense

of a shared fate, a conviction that the well-being of this
country is indivisible from that of its partners and dependent
in turn on a stable world environment to which all must
contribute .

This is more than a philosophical notion; it has

immense political significance, reinforcing Japan's global
involvement and insuring its steadily growin g importance on
the world scene.

Not all of the changes in the U.S.-Japan relationship
have taken place on this side of the Pacific.

There have been

some important developments in the United States as well, and
they are very similar to what has happened here .

We have been

- 15 -

aware for many years of the extent of our economic interdependence
with Japan.

But for us, as for the Japanese, it has never been

clearer that we are not only navigating the same hazardous
waters, we are infact in the same boat.

Cooperation and joint

action in dealing with inflation or energy are not options, they
are imperatives.

As a nation, we have probably been less aware

until recently of the fact that we and Japan are equally
interdependent in other ways as well .

The events of the past

six months, in particular the Iran crisis, have been very
revealing in this respect .

We have sought the support of our

friends and allies, and we have received it.

I was convinced during my recent trip horne that Japan is
seen in a new and rather different light.

-

Public opinion

polls bear out my impression: a Potomac Associates survey
taken last month showed significant increases in the percentage
of Americans who rank Japan as the most important country for
-----,
the United States (89 percent--only Canada ranked higher); who
would favor using armed force to defend Japan against attack
from the Soviets or any other quarter; and who support the continued
maintenance of our forces in this country.

Clearly, Japan's

contribution to our partnership, the value of its friendship,
its steadfastness as an ally are much more broadly recognized
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than was once the case .

In short , there is a stronger

commitment to the relationship among the American people, just
as I believe is true in Japan.

The conclusion I have reached

and which I commend to you is that, while the crises of recent
months have indeed generated tensions and imposed strains, our
partnership has emerged not weaker, but stronger than before.
We have truly gained strength from adversity.

The years ahead promise to be as active and challenging
for the United States as any period in our history, replete
with crisis--andwithopportunity.

We will face new problems

that will not have occurred to even the most visionary among
us.

We will probably find ourselves contending as well with

some old and familiar problems re-emerging in new and perhaps
occasionally more virulent forms.

But if we can be assured

of difficulties in our path, so we can look ahead with equal
certainty toward myriad new opportunities, in which Japan and
the United States will merge their efforts in pursuit of
common goals .

I said at the outset that I was not going to try to
predict the future.

But as I think my remarks make clear,

I am optimistic about the ability of the United States and
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Japan, working together, to c ope with anything it has to offer .
Success is not assured, and we ignore the state of our relations
only at our risk .

For while our ties are strong , they are not,

as we well know , inevitably trouble - free .

Sus taining a productive

partnership such as we enjoy requires the continued , dedicated
attention of both our governments and , more fundamentally ,
patient and steady efforts to strengthen the foundation of
understanding and mutual regard among all elements of our
societies upon which all else rests .
problems in our relationship , or

We can never eliminate

erase all our differences.

Our task is to minimize those problems , narrow our differences
as much as we can , and be prepared to to l erate opposing points
of view when they cannot be reconciled.
Making it work can be difficult .

The formula is simple.

We have succeeded in the past,

however-- to the great benefit of our two peoples and of the
world-- and we shall in the future .

*

*

*

AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD'S RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS POSED AT
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS CLUB
May 22, 1980
JOHN RODERICK (AP):

Mr-:- Am b a s s a do r·; -yo u s p o ke a bo u t

managing problems between- the United - states and Japan·· while
they are- deve-lo-ping, howe-ver-m-a-de ·no references of course
to.. adj.o-in-ing -co untries··. ·· Bu-t; as \'le

kno~1,

today a

pr:.a.b.J_e.m_is developing in South Korea. _ It started
.-.

a f·te-r-t~- assassin a ti-o rr-o f
It- has now
~$

we stt

6-

Pre~ i

..

tO- lilO...\l.e

-

<teJTrP ark--tow a r.ds. democracy.

been·-s-to-we-&-- ·tn·tn ~tra-ck-5-.

r~Pa,

_very~ _gr_~ve

the city of Kwangju is

At this very moment
ta~en

over by ele-

ments which seem to be favorable to democracy.

What is the

United States doing to s·-trit-ge manage O+:-ma-n.a-ge or

do-in~ ·-to

affect the outcome of this very grave struggle?

AMBASSADOR:

Well, John, what•s happening in the Repub-

1 ic of Korea is of great concern to all of us and to both

our countries, but it just happens that Korea is outside
my p o r t f o 1 i o .

It also happens that we have probably our

best ambas~ador in this part of th~ world, if not the best
in the world, in Bill Gleysteen, and r•m sure that anything
that can be done will be done by Bill Gleysteen, and that
in his hands our interests are in good shape.

(laughter)
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BRUCE MACDONELL

(NBC):

Mr. Ambassador, you pointed

out that there has been a . good deal of cooperation on the
Iranian-Afghan issues.

However, there is reason to believe

that later a:n today the 'Olympics b-o-yc-o-t-t- -4--s-s-ue will b.e
h-an-d-le-d--b-y

Japanese athletes to compete as

allowi-n-g - ~-e

individuals.

If that is so, won't this be rather hollow

cooperative success?

AMBASSADOR:

~le-l-1 -,-

Bruce, I referred to the attitude,

aRd til-e pos,itive attitude, of the Japanese government in

relation to a possible Olympic boycott.
ernment

h~s

m~de

The Japanese gov-

it clear to its Olympic Committee, as we

made it clear to our Olympic Committee where we stood, and
recognize the fact that the decision was in the hands of
the respective Olympic Committees concerned.
I personally am against the Olympics, not really
because of

Afghanist~n.

but the Olympic

G~mes

but because it has become anything
according to their original intent.

They have be~n terrorized by the murder of the Israelis
in Munich in '72.
fore

th~t.

They have been commercialized long be-

They have been politicized to a la!ge extent,

and I think that it is time for the Olympic Committees to
take a look at what they're engaging in and try and do
something to bring about a return to the original intent and
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get away from these very heavy handicaps which are making
it so difficult for these people today.
I will wait and see just how they word that announcement which you indicated might be forthcoming today
when the Olympic Committee of Japan issues its statement.

GEBHARD HIELSCHER

(Suddeutsche Zeitung):

Mr. Ambassador,

you have said that the Japanese-U.S. bilateral relations
haye emerged as the most important bilateral relations for
the U.S.

I'm aware of evident changes in that relation.

I am also aware of the results of the Potomac Associates
survey which, though, also says, for instance, in the area
of where you would be willing, how many people would feel
it necessary that the U.S. should come to the defense of
Japan in case of aggression, that 64 percent said so in the
case of Japan, but more people said so in the case of
Britain or France.
So I'm just

~sking

what other indications do you

have to back up your statement of the most important bilateral
relationship vis-a-vis some of the traditional allies like
Britain or France in Europe, and could you elaborate in
that context a little bit more on your experiences in Washington

at the recent visit of Prime Minister Ohira?
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AMBASSADOR:

Well, that's a long question, but I'll

do the best I can.

First, let me say that the figure you

used is correct, but I have felt for a long time that the
United States has been paying too much attention to the
Atlantic and Western Europe and not enough attention to
the Pactfic and East Asia.

I can understand why that re-

mains the policy, though I detect signs of its being
shaken at present.
Most of our people came from across the Atlantic,
but since the time of Geo!ge Washington the push has always
been

we~tward

into Asia.

across the continent, across the Pacific,

I think that thisis where everything is happen-

ing.
I think the most important--! repeat--bilateral
relationship we have in the world is with Japan.

I think

the most important strategic area in the world is in the
North Pacific, not in Western Europe.

If you look at the

map, you will find the PRC, the Soviet Union, the U.S.,
Japan, right close to one another, and right in the middle
is Korea which was the subject of the first question this
afternoon.
It is out here where American business has its
opportunities, where the biggest returns are and where you
have I think the most friendly governments, not only friendly

5

governments but friendly people, markets, resources, and
to put it briefly I would say it is in the Pacific and
Ea s· t As i a wli e r e i t a 11 i s , wh a t i t ' s a 1 1 a b o u t , a n d a s f a r
as my country is

concer~ed

where their future lies.

The relationship with

Japa~

may not be as long

as it has been with Germany, but there isn't too much difference when you get down to the time factors involved.
/

As far as our cousins in the United Kingdom are concerned,
that has been a long relationship, with France likewise,
t~ough

with many tremblers in between.

people _ get along.

But that's the way

We have our differences with the French,

with the British, with the Germans and with the Japanese,
but if we didn't have these differences I don't think we
would be very _ good friends.
But to make it brief, this is where it all is and
this is where we should have at least a strength based on
parity

wit~

what we have in the Atlantic and on Western

Europe, and I think the events of Iran and Afghanistan
are bringirg that home to us in a big way.
We reacted.

We didn't act.

It's about time we started to do some acting

ourselves .in shiftirg thro _ugh our priorities and recognizing
where

~ur

most important primary interests lie.

(applause)
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JQN WORONOFF

(Asia Business):

You mentioned at the very

beginning that tnere are many surprises in politics.

Can

you explain how over time the American government and the
Japanese government have been able to some extent to align
their policy?

What would happen if in another month or

so there is another surprise and instead of having an LOP
government there was a coalition government and among
parties which have a slightly different attitude towards
many of the policy points from the LOP?

AMBASSADOR:

Well, in politics the only certainty is

uncertainty as was proven last Friday, and no one can be
sure, and when I was in the Senate I was never certain
till the votes were counted.

Then I knew what the result

really was.
But as far as the differences are concerned, we
can accommqdate ourselves with them.

After all, the

greatest art in the field of politics is compromise, or
in other words accommodation.
I dQ notwant to, as I've indicated in my remarks,
become involved in Japanese internal politics.
you

envis~ge

When what

happens, then we'll face up to it, but no

matter what it is I'm quite certain in my own mind that
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the foundation on which Japanese-American partnership or
friendship rests will survive, and _ grow stronger in the
years and the decades ahead.

UMAR "KAHN

(Arab News Agency):

Mr. Ambassador, in your

remarks you said that whatever you have been doing until
now was a reaction

pertaini~g

to certain things happening

in my part of the world in the Middle East.
no~

it is time for you to do some action.

You said that
So, what actions

do you suggest to take, because let me just point out that
the whole thing started in Afghanistan with the daylight
murder of the American Ambassador over there, and President
Carter simply said nothing and did
thi~g

nothi~g,

and the whole

started from there.
And then this, I'm not sure, the action in Iran to

rescue the 53 people.

That's another thing, so are you
wnich
pointing out these actions/may cause another war in the world,

or what actions are you pointing out to?

AMBASSADOR:

Quite the contrary.

To answer you in one

word, the policy I advocate is patience. (laughter and clapping)

ROBERT NEFF

(McGraw Hill):

Mr. Ambassador, Reuben Askew

left here a few days ago saying that he was very disappointed
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with the lack of progress in the negotiations between the
United States and Japan on the question of procurement by
NTT.

Just exactly where do those negotiations stand.

You

said in your speech you don't like to make predictions.
What prospects do you see for a settlement, and how important
an issue is this in Japanese-U.S. economic relations?

AMBASSADOR:

Well, I'm optimistic.

a good, worthwhile

excha~ge

Askew while he was here.
Ushiba

~greement,

I think there was

between the Japanese and Governor

I would point out that the Straus-

which was initialed last June, still has

till December 31st to run, and it's hoped that before that
time, as a result of continued

n~gotiations,

that a reci-

procal agreement will be arrived at which will be mutually
satisfactory to both countries.
So I think that Askew made progress in widening
the conversations, meeting with the appropriate people
here as far as government procurement is concerned, and I
think he made very good progress, too, as far as the automobile situation was concerned, all things considered.
.

GEBHARD HIELSCHER

(Suddeutsche Zeitung):

At the recent

Trilat e ral Confe r e nce in London, I think Mr. Ball suggested
this idea of Japan could produce two aircraft carriers and

-·
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lease them to the U.S.
almost an unbelievable

There was quite, shall we say,
outr~ge

type of reaction in Japan.

Could 1ou elaborate a little bit?

The U.S. government

maybe hopes, or your personal views on the issue where
1ou could see any scope for cooperation in Japan's military
procurement or in arms production or any such lease arrangement as Mr. Ball has suggested.

Do you find that

completely out of reality, or do you see, in contrast to
Mr. Ball, any reasonable chance, even as a mid-term or
long-term prospect?

AMBASSADOR :

The United States government has expressed

no opinion on an opinion made by a private citizen
George Ball.

As far as my personal opinion is concerned,

I think it's a way out, far out idea.
trouble

findi~g

We seem to have

enough personnel to man the carriers we

haye at the present time.
I don't think we ought to _ get Japan too involved.
Japan has done remarkably well in its own defense situation
in view of Article 9 of the so-called Peace Constitution, in
view of how they had to getaround through the creation of a
75,000 man Self Defense Force, and out of that came the
Police Reserve Force, and out of that Police Reserve Force
came the present Self Defense Forces.
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The Japanese are not interested in becoming a
manufacturi~g

armory for other nations, and if there are

things thqt have to be done I think we ought to be able
to do them ourselves.
Wnat I would ratner see would be the Japanese to
c o n t i n ue . Th i s

j

s t he i r r e s po n s i b i 1 i t y wh a t t h e y h a ve be e n

doing for the last decade or more, and that is to modernize
tneir naval elements and to update their anti-submarine
and air defense facilities, and they are doing all those
things.
They have a part to play in the defense of their
home islands and the

~eas

keep in mind the fact tnat

adjacent thereto.
th~y

They have to

are not ready as yet to

put into operation a regional force.

And I would say, to

repeat, that the Japanese have been doing the right thing
at the right pace in the right way for the past decade.
for example, during that decade they increased their defense
expenditures at an average rate of 8 percent a year.

The

NATO countries increased their defense expenditures at a
rate of 2 percent a year, and the United States decreased
it~

defense expenffitures over the decade of the Seventies, the

same period, at a rate of 2 percent a year.
Now, th e progress of the Japanese in this respect
hqs been steady and significant, and they have helped to
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~chieve

gre~t

stability and to be able to fulfil their own

respon~ibilities

Ocean

~nd

when, because of events in the Indian

the Arabian Sea

and that area, we had to trans-

fer elements of the Seventh Fleet to that particular
region.

TED SHIMIZU

(Kyodo):

Mr . Ambassador, what is your pre-

diction on the outcome of the U. S. presidential elections?

AMBASSADOR:

Hell, it looks like President Carter will

get the nomination .

candidate than a lot of people anticipated, and if

$tron~er
th~t

crats

It looks like John Anderson will be a

is true he will draw votes mo s tly away from the Demo~nd

bec~u$e

make it more difficult for the Democrats to win

of the developing Carter-Kennedy feud, and it also

might throw the election in the House of Representatives
if neither Carter nor Reagan get the required majority.
There, of course, it will be decided by the so-called
electoral college, which is not a college.
professors.

JON WORONOFF

It has no

(.laughter)

(Asia Business):

I'm certain that you can

keep on outwitting the working press .

(laughter)

I•m not
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certain what your exact term was, whether its increasing
agreement or accommodation or coming closer together behieen the Japanese and the Americans on a number .of economic
points.

M1BASSADOR:

Coming closer together.

JOHN WORONOFF:

Okay.

How much of a gap is there, for

example, on the question of defense?

The Japanese seem to

be willing within another few years to reach 1 percent.

I

have read that some people on the American side would like
to see 1.5 or 2 percent.

AMBASSADOR:

No gap.

It's up to the Japanese.

all, Japan is a sovereign nation.
decisions.

After

It has to make its own

It has to decide what is best, and so far I

think it has done a very good job on its own responsibility,
a nd t h a t ' s the wa y i t s h o u1 d be .

Th at ' s the way i t wi 11 be ,

and we are not . going to attempt in any way, shape or form to
tell the ' Japanese what they should or shouldn't do.

JOHN WORONOFF:

Although there seems to be a slight cooling

off of the problem regarding exports of automobiles to the
United States, in the meanwhile Mr. Fraser, who addressed us
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here some time ago, seems to have increased the ante, so the
apart
gap migQt be as far/or even further apart than it used to be.
What are tne chances of tQe United States
on Japanese exports to

th~

imposi~g

limits

United States, and what is the

chance of not only coming closer together but reaching some
sort of an agreement which will hold?

AMBASSADOR:

Well, as far as reducing imports are con-

cerned, the President has made his position clear.

Askew

has made his position clear before congressional committees,
and he did so again here even at his last press conference
which I think you attended.

He said he would not recommend

import restrictions, that they would create a situation
which could become highly inflationary and would not solve
the problem of unemployment.
I would point out that the Japanese have been making
gestures and evolving policies.

I recall that just about a

year ago J sent letters to all the Japanese auto manufacturers
asking them to use American auto parts.

The Japanese auto

manufacturers gave serious consideration to it, but I began
to receive letters from them saying that at that time the
American auto parts people were not interested or if they did their
work wasn't up to Japanese standard.
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And then, of course, we had the changeover which
I think you can blame the· American auto industry for.
The.y should have seen the

ha~dwriting

on the wall.

In '73

they started to change over then, and now they are trying
to play catch-up, but it is . going to cost them 70 to 80
billion dollars, and in the meantime you've got foreign
cars taking over the field because that is what the
American customers want.
Honda is
and

Nis~an

somew~ere

States.

buildi~g

a 10,000 auto facility in Ohio,

has announced a 10,000 a month truck facility
in the Great Lakes or the southeast of the United

Toyota has hired three high grade analytical groups

to look into the situation as it might affect possible investments in the United States, and I think they are showing good faith and for the first time are really getting
down to bedrock.

They're getting serious.

Also, one of the results of Askew's trip here was
an increp,sed amount in the purchase

of American auto parts

for Japanese cars, and we hope that progress will continue
along that line.
Now, you also mentioned I believe something about a
1 or 1.5 percent defense expenditure.
of GNP.

That is 1.5 percent

I notice where Admiral Zumwalt had something in

the papers this morning advocating a 2 percent increase of
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defen~e

to be

expenditures by Japan.

t~e

You know, Zumwalt used

Chief of Naval Operations some eight or ten

years ago, and now he's a private citizen.
ou~ht

I think we

to try and keep the record clear.
If we calculate Japanese defense expenditures on

the same basis that NATO and the United States does, instead
of

~pending

less than l percent, they're spending some-

where between 1. l and 1. 2 percent.
Even

tho~gn

That • s a 1 ot of money.

it's from a small base, it's certainly a lot

when it is tied to a GNP which totals well over a trillion
dqllars.

CHARLES SMITH

(Financial Times):

My question is partly

asked, but maybe there is a bit more to say on the subject.
Do you think it is realistic to expect Japanese car manufacturers to produce passenger cars in the United States
when it seems to be the case that they can produce cars
more efficiently and more cheaply in Japan?

AMBASSADOR:

Yes, I think it is.

As I've told Mr.

Ishiwara of Nissan and Mr. Goto--I think he's here this
afternoon--of the same company, and Mr. Toyoda, I told them
that it will be a good idea for them to invest in the United
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States.

Well, they raised questions about labor laws and

this and that, and I pointed out the fact that Volkswagen
came in, worked out a special deal I think for three years
with the UAW.

I'm sure it was probably given some tax

concessions and maybe some land in the area in Pennsylvania
in which they located their plant, and that the consensus
was--that's - a nice Japanese word (laughter)--the consensus
was tQat the quality of the American auto worker in
Volkswagen, Pennsylvania, was better than the quality of the
German worker in the Federal Republic.

Now they are going

to build a second plant outside of Detroit .
What J told theJapanese when they raised the question--arid their

argume~ts

were valid, after all,

have

~hev

to look at not only those factors but profitability as
well--! told them it was my impression that the Japanese
reputation was so _ good, based on quality product they
produce

at a competitive price, the follow-through services

which they furnish and thedemand among the American people
that they could _ go into any country in the world and compete
with any auto company anywhere in the world and still come
out even or on top.

So tQey've . got the reputation.

J

they've . got the capability, they turn out the quality, the
price is riqht. the people want it. they follow throuqh
with service.

I think thev can do it anywhere.
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ALAN GOODALL

(The Australian):

Mr. Chairman, I would like

to give an opportjnity to the Ambassador to answer a question that his boss

U.S. Secretary of State Muskie dodged

yesterday, and that is how long can the United States contlnue tQ support an ally that lacks internal political
support, namely South Korea?

AMBASSADOR:

As long as necessary.

(laughter - applause)

ROBERT NEFF:

To shift back to more mundane questions,

the U.S. Customs has recently announced that it is going to
start

impo~ing

imports.

a 25 percent import duty on Japanese truck

There are reports that President Carter probably

will reduce that duty significantly.
prospects?

What indeed are the

At what level are those import duties likely to

be set, and to what extent is that issue linked to U.S.
efforts to persuade the Japanese to build car factories in
the U.S.?

AMBASSADOR:

To answer the last part of your question

first, there is no connection between that and our efforts
tQ get the Japanese to invest in the United States.

As

far as the fore part of your question is concerned, I read
the same papers you have.

I don't know too much about it

18

necqu~e

we receive nothing in the way of an official dis-

patch.

How do you like that for dodging?

(laughter)

But it's true.

KEN KONDO

(Mainichi):

On the defense spending issue,

you said that the Japanese are doing the right thing at
the right pace, but I wonder do you think your assessment
is reflected on Washington policy?

AMBASSADOR:

Let me get that again.

KEN KONDO:

Your assessment on Japanese defense spend-

ing or what we are doing on the defense issue, is your
assessment reflected on the Washington policy, Administration
polic¥, or your advice or your assessment is rather not
neglected but ...

AMBASSADOR:

Well, my

ad~ice

that you so kindly re-

ferred tq hqs been passed on many times to the people in
Was~ington,

and if they don't know the facts it's their

own fault.

(laughter)

LEE

(Chosun Ilbo):

I came from the trouble spot. (laughter)

I heard from many Americans, including some officials, that
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it
they feel/no longer necessary to maintain American . ground
forces in Korea where :Ame'r ican influence is decreasing.
you just a

w~ile

But

ago stressed the strategic importance of

Northeast Asia, including the Korean Peninsula.

What is

your evaluation, and do vou still feel it necessarv to
maintain Americanground forces?

AMBASSADOR:

I approved of President Carter's view

of w-ith.drawing the Second Division from Korea in . gradual
~tages,

but when some of our intelligence agencies came

up with new estimates ... as to how strong North Korea
actually was, I approved th.e postponement,announced in
Korea last June I believe by the President, of the withdrawal of the Second Division.
will be indefinite.

I think that postponement

They will be there for a long time to

come, but I would like to see the South Koreans themselves,
once they achieve a degree of normality--though one finds
i t ha r'd t o d e f i n e wh a t

11

n o r ma 1 i t y

11

i s i n t h e Re p u b 1 i c o f

Korea--that they would be able to upgrade their equipment,
both in the air, on land and at sea, and I would hope that
out of these talks intermittently conducted

between the

North and South. Koreans, something substantial will develop,
but there is no indication of that at the present time.
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Sq we will just have to wait and see how events
~ork

out.

lt'~

had more thqn

a sad country.

it~

It's a tragic country.

It

share of sorrow and sacrifice, but it is

a friend, and we intend to stick with them to the end.

UMAR

KA~N;

Mr. Ambassador, I own a small Honda

Japanese car, and I think the secret of the Japanese car
seen in America and everywhere was because they burn less
.fuel.
them .

I think that was the only trick that was working for
Do you think the

America, giants,

GM and other big companies in

whose fund is more than probably some of

these bi9 countries' total GNP, would they be sitting idle
and not bringing out smaller cars to compete in technology
and using lesser fuel than the Japanese plants that will
be estqblished there?

AMBASSADOR:

Well, I would hope they're not sitting

by idly because if they are it's just going to be a repeat
of what has happened in years gone by because not only do
ynu get better mileage out of Japanese cars, and some

European cars as well, but you also have some excellent
anti-pollution control devices and they are of better
standards than the State of California, the strongest in
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the cquntry as far as the

~tates

are concerned, and they

exceed the standards which the federal government has
passed legislatively in the form of laws and which will
go into effect I think in 1983 or 1984.

If we are going

to compete with the Japanese, we better compete and not
~ust

sit bqck or expect legislation to get us out of holes

which we dig for ourselves.

MARY ANN MASKERY

(ABC):

You talked about talking to

Japanese automobile companies, trying to encourage them
to get into investment in the United States.

Do you think

there will be any more encouragement from the U.S. government for direct investment, or do you think the recent
Japanese offer on auto parts will end the auto issue as
such on the government-to-government level?

AMBASSADOR:

No, it won't end the auto issue, and our

goyernment would still like to see Japanese car makers
invest in theUnited States.

But I think we should be

hqnest about this and realize that even if all the things
we ask the Japanese to do, except to reduce exports,
wouldn't cure

an unemployment problem which totals some-

where around 225-250,000 men at the present time.

It will

take two or three years for the changeover to occur, and
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it's

goi~g

to be a difficult period, and especially so

in tQis election year.

CHARLES SMITH:

Mr. Mansfield, you said that the United

Stqtes intended to stick with South Korea to the end and
to give full support to your friends in South Korea.

In

that case, I wonder what you feel about the policy of
inhibiting SouthKorea's economic growth by restricting imports into the United States of products, such as Korean
colqr TV sets.

AMBASSADOR:

I wouldn't be in favor of it.

I'm

free trqder, I guess. (laughter)

NOBORU ONOKI (Sankei):
Mr. Ambassador, after the meetthe
ing between/Japanese Prime Minister and your President,
your government official leaked that your President didn't
~atisfy

the recent past popular movement in Korea, and I

believe that must have influenced these days' unrest coming
~

up in the cquntry.
during

On the other hand, it seems to me that

the past time, your . government agency has been en-

couraging some anti-governmental group to do something.
Thank you.
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AMBASSADOR:

I wouldn't think so, and I would imagine

that Ambqssador Gleysteen would know how to keep his hands
cle~n

qnd avoid . getting too close to the fire.

If you are

referring to a postulatP. at the time of the Ohira meetina.
the question of Korea came up between him and President
Carter, absolutelynot.
shape

or

Korea was not mentioned in any way,

form.

JEAN PEARCE

(Free lance}:

article l read recently

A Japanese commentator in an

s~ggested

that the real reason that

the United States is interested in luring Japanese manufacturers to that country

is that so they, the Japanese

manufacturers, will then get strangl e d in negotiations with
the United Automobile Workers Union, that's giving the
American manufacturers an opportunity to catch up.
wonder if you could comment on

AMBASSAJOR:
dumb.

th ~ t.

I

(laughter)

The Japanese auto manufacturers are not

llaughter}
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